Eroding Trust in the Indian National Government

The latest issue of The Economist carries an article which talks about the “eroding trust in national governments”. This article is based on a poll conducted by Gallup in 2007 and again in 2012 with one simple question “do you trust your national government?”. World over, the proportion of people answering “yes” to this question has dipped significantly between the two years.

Source: The Economist, Nov 16th 2013

 

Now, this graph has been sorted by the orange dots (2012 data) so India is lost somewhere in the middle. What if, however, this graph were sorted by the 2007 numbers (white dots)? Notice that the white dot for India is very close to the 90% mark – the highest ever achieved among all countries surveyed in this poll!

This just goes to show the kind of confidence the Indian National Government (UPA-1) enjoyed back in 2007, perhaps a result of the populist schemes it had launched such as the NREGA. This was before any of the scams hit, and this goodwill might have resulted in the government getting voted back into power in 2009. The interesting thing, though, is that the number for India is still higher than that of a large number of OECD countries.

PS: I would have drawn this graph differently. Rather than using a scatter-plot like this, I would have rather used a slope-graph, which would have shown the relative standings in both years and also the way the ratings have moved.

 

Fighterization of Government

The problem with the proposed Jan Lok Pal bill is that it’s highly personality dependent. Given the kind of powers they want vested in the Lok Pal, it is clear that the proponents of this bill (Anna Hazare and co.) have simply assumed that a “good and incorruptible person” will occupy this post. What they don’t seem to have considered is that governments usually mess up in such appointments and it’s not guaranteed that a “good and incorruptible person” will always occupy this post. And that for that precise reason it’s dangerous to create an institution whose performance is highly dependent on the person occupying the post.

I’m reminded of two “high offices” to which people are appointed by the Central Government. Both these offices have gained prominence due to their occupation by high-quality people who did much to enhance the stature of this office, but have been undermined later by the government (UPA 1 and UPA2 in this case) appointing people with shady backgrounds to this post.

The first is the office of the Chief Election Commissioner. While this post has existed since the time of the first general election, the office was brought to prominence by former CEC TN Seshan. He was followed by a few other respectable gentlemen (James Michael Lyngdoh comes to mind). But then who did the UPA appoint to this post? Congress crony Navin Chawla, who in his earlier avatar as an IAS officer had been indicted by court as being “unfit to hold public office”.

The other case refers to the Central Vigilance Commissioner. By definition, this is a vigilance office and one of the implicit duties of this job is “vigilance”, which implies action against corrupt practices. You can think of this post as being a sort of a “mini Lok Pal” (for bureaucrats only, politicians being excluded). Again, when this post was created it was assumed that “honest impeccable incorruptible persons” would occupy it. And who did the UPA try to put there (before the Supreme Court struck down the appointment)? PJ Thomas, who had been indicted in a scam about 10 years ago.

There is no guarantee that people like Chawla or Thomas could come to occupy the post of the “lok pal”, which will completely undermine the purpose of the institution. I hope the thousands of people who are blindly supporting the “Jan Lok Pal bill” (and this includes you, Bharatiya Janata Party) take this little technicality to note. I exhort them to ask themselves if they’ll be ok having Navin Chawla or PJ Thomas as the Lok Pal. If they think it’s ok even if such people were to occupy the post, they can go ahead wiht their support. My assumption, though, is that most people haven’t really thought about this angle and are blindly supporting the anti-government agitations.

Coming to the title of this post, what we need is to create institutions that are not personality-dependent. We need to create institutions and systems with appropriate checks and balances such that even if people of “lesser integrity” were to occupy it, it wouldn’t be possible for them to significantly undermine the office. We need to effectively “fighterize” these posts in order to ensure that it’s not possible to sabotage them by means of a few bad men occupying them.

And the way I see it, the institution of the Lok Pal as envisaged by the Jan Lok Pal Bill (or by the government-sponsored bill for that matter) is highly personality dependent. And that is one of the reasons I’m opposed to this current Anna-Swami-Baba movement.

Standard Error in Survey Statistics

Over the last week or more, one of the topics of discussion in the pink papers has been the employment statistics that were recently published by the NSSO. Mint, which first carried the story, has now started a whole series on it, titled “The Great Jobs Debate” where people from both sides of the fence have been using the paper to argue their case as to why the data makes or doesn’t make sense.

The story started when Mint Editor and Columnist Anil Padmanabhan (who, along with Aditya Sinha (now at DNA) and Aditi Phadnis (of Business Standard), ranks among my favourite political commentators in India) pointed out that the number of jobs created during the first UPA government (2004-09) was about 1 million, which is far less than the number of jobs created during the preceding NDA government (~ 60 million). And this has led to hue and cry from all sections. Arguments include leftists who say that jobless growth is because of too much reforms, rightists saying we aren’t creating jobs because we haven’t had enough reform, and some other people saying there’s something wrong in the data. Chief Statistician TCA Anant, in his column published in the paper, tried to use some obscurities in the sub-levels of the survey to point out why the data makes sense.

In today’s column, Niranjan Rajadhyaksha points out that the way employment is counted in India is very different from the way it is in developed countries. In the latter, employers give statistics of their payroll to the statistics collection agency periodically. However, due to the presence of the large unorganized sector, this is not possible in India so we resort to “surveys”, for which the NSSO is the primary organization.

In a survey, to estimate a quantity across a large sample, we simply take a much smaller sample, which is small enough for us to rigorously measure this quantity. Then, we try and extrapolate the results to the large sample. The key thing in survey is “standard error”, which is a measure of error that the “observed statistic” is different from the “true statistic”. What intrigues me is that there is absolutely no mention of the standard error in any of the communication about this NSSO survey (again I’m relying on the papers here, haven’t seen the primary data).

Typically, when we measure something by means of a survey, the “true value” is usually expressed in terms of the “95% confidence range”. What we say is “with 95% probability, the true value of XXXX lies between Xmin and Xmax”. An alternate way of representation is “we think the value of XXXX is centred at Xmid with a standard error of Xse”. So in order to communicate numbers computed from a survey, it is necessary to give out two numbers. So what is the NSSO doing by reporting just one number (most likely the mid)?

Samples used by NSSO are usually very small. At least, they are very small compared to the overall population, which makes the standard error to be very large. Could it be that the standard error is not reported because it’s so large that the mean doesn’t make sense? And if the standard error is so large, why should we even use this data as a basis to formulate policy?

So here’s my verdict: the “estimated mean” of the employment as of 2009 is not very different from the “estimated mean” of the employment as of 2004. However, given that the sample sizes are small, the standard error will be large. So it is very possible that the true mean of employment as of 2009 is actually much higher than the true mean of 2004 (by the same argument, it could be the other way round, which points at something more grave). So I conclude that given the data we have here (assuming standard errors aren’t available), we have insufficient data to conclude anything about the job creation during the UPA1 government, and its policy implications.