Continuous and barrier regulation

One of the most important pieces of financial regulation in the US and Europe following the 2008 financial crisis is the designation of certain large institutions as “systemically important”, or in other words “too big to fail”. Institutions thus designated have greater regulatory and capital requirements, thus rendering them at a disadvantage compared to smaller competitors.

This is by design – one of the intentions of the “SiFi” (systemically important financial regulations) is to provide incentives to companies to become smaller so that the systemic risk is reduced. American insurer Metlife, for example, decided to hive off certain divisions so that it’s not a SiFi any more.

AIG, another major American insurer (which had to be bailed out during the 2008 financial crisis), is under pressure from its activist investors led by Carl Icahn to similarly break up so that it can avoid being a SiFi. The FT reports that there were celebrations in Italy when insurer Generali managed to get itself off the global SiFi list. Based on all this, the SiFi regulation seems to be working in spirit.

The problem, however, is with the method in which companies are designated SiFis, or rather, with that SiFi is a binary definition. A company is either a SiFi or it isn’t –  there is no continuum. This can lead to perverse incentives for companies to escape the SiFi tag, which might undermine the regulation.

Let’s say that the minimum market capitalisation for a company to be defined a SiFi is $10 billion (pulling this number out of thin air, and assuming that market cap is the only consideration for an entity to be classified as a SiFi). Does this mean that a company that is worth $10 Bn is “systemically important” but one that is worth $9.9 Bn is not? This might lead to regulatory arbitrage that might lead to a revision of the benchmark, but it still remains a binary thing.

A better method for regulation would be for the definition of SiFi to be continuous, or fuzzy, so that as the company’s size increases, its “SiFiness” also increases proportionally, and the amount of additional regulations it has to face goes up “continuously” rather than being hit by a “barrier”. This way, the chances of regulatory arbitrage remain small, and the regulation will indeed serve its purpose.

SiFi is just one example – there are several other cases which are much better served by regulating companies (or individuals) as a continuum and not classifying them into discrete buckets. When you regulate companies as parts of discrete buckets, there is always the temptation to change just enough to move from one bucket to the other, and that might result in gaming. Continuous regulation, on the other hand, leaves no room for such marginal gaming – marginal changes aer only giong to have a marginal impact.

Perhaps for something like SiFi, where the requirements of being a SiFi are binary (compliance, etc.) there may not be a choice but to keep the definition discrete (if there are 10 different compliance measures, they can kick in at 10 different points, to simulate a continuous definition).

However, when the classification results in monetary benefits or costs (let’s say something like SiFis paying additional regulatory costs) it can be managed via non-linear funding. Let’s say that you pay 10% fees (for whatever) in category A and 12% in category B (which you get to once you cross a benchmark). A simply way to regulate would be to have the fees as a superlinear function of your market cap (if that’s what the benchmark is based on).

 

Put Comment